--- name: journal-of-law-economics-and-organization description: Use when targeting Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (JLEO) or deciding whether a manuscript at the intersection of law, economics, and organization fits this venue. Encodes the journal's fit, framing, method-and-evidence bar, house style, official-submission re-check, and desk-reject heuristics. --- # Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (journal-of-law-economics-and-organization) ## Journal positioning JLEO is the leading journal at the intersection of law, economics, and organization, publishing positive political theory, the economics of contracts and institutions, and organizational economics. It rewards papers — theoretical or empirical — that explain how legal rules, political institutions, and organizational arrangements shape behavior and outcomes. The readership spans economists, political scientists, and organizational scholars working in the institutions-and-organizations tradition, so a paper must carry a genuine law-economics-organization contribution, not a single-discipline result. This skill is a **fit / venue-selection / re-framing** tool. It does not replace the journal's current official submission guidelines. Before submitting, re-check the live author instructions on the journal/Oxford University Press site and the editorial submission system. ## When to trigger - The author names JLEO as the target venue, or wants a home at the law–economics–organization intersection. - A paper analyzes contracts, institutions, political institutions, or organizational form with economic tools. - A positive-political-theory or organizational-economics paper needs re-framing so the institutions-and-organization contribution is foregrounded. - The author needs JLEO's desk-reject risks and a credible institutions / organization alternative list. ## Scope & topic fit - Positive political theory: institutions, legislatures, bureaucracy, delegation, and the economics of politics. - The economics of contracts, property rights, and incomplete contracting. - Organizational economics: firm boundaries, hierarchy, incentives, and governance. - Institutional analysis of law and regulation and how organizational/political structures shape outcomes. ## Method & evidence bar - Theory papers need clearly stated models, correct equilibrium analysis, and results that illuminate institutions or organization; assumptions must map to the institutional setting. - Empirical papers need credible identification (experiments, quasi-experiments, DiD, IV, RDD, or well-justified design) with threats pre-empted, and defensible measurement of institutional/organizational variables. - Both modeling and empirics are welcome, but the contribution must be about the law–economics–organization mechanism, not a generic effect. - Inference and robustness must meet current standards; institutional detail must be accurate. ## Structure & house style - The introduction states the institutional/organizational question, the model or data, the approach, and the headline result early, and explains the law-economics-organization contribution. - Position against the relevant positive-political-theory / organizational-economics literature; relate the model or design to the institutional setting explicitly. - Uses an unstructured abstract; an appendix carries proofs, derivations, institutional detail, and robustness. - Propositions and exhibits should be self-contained; the central result (model implication or credible effect) should be clearly stated. ## Official-submission checklist - Before giving submission-ready advice, read `../../resources/source-basis.md` and `../../resources/official-source-map.md`; start from the official source anchors for this journal family, then cite the current journal-specific page you checked. - Search the live site for "Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization instructions for authors / submission guidelines" and follow the current Oxford University Press version. - Re-check formatting, abstract requirements, anonymization, and proof/appendix conventions on the submission system. - Re-check the current data and code availability / replication policy for empirical work. - If the live official instructions conflict with this skill, the official instructions win. ## Pre-submission self-check - [ ] One sentence stating the law–economics–organization mechanism and why it matters for institutions or organization. - [ ] The contribution is stated as a model implication / credible institutional effect, not as statistical significance. - [ ] The introduction positions the paper against the current positive-political-theory / organizational-economics frontier. - [ ] Proofs are complete and correct, or identification and measurement of institutional variables are defensible. - [ ] Appendix, institutional detail, and (if empirical) data/code are ready for the official policy. ## Common desk-reject triggers - A single-discipline paper (pure law, pure politics, or generic economics) with no institutions-and-organization contribution. - A theory paper with incomplete proofs or assumptions that do not map to the institutional setting. - An empirical paper with mismeasured institutional variables and no credible identification. - A generic effect dressed up as an organizational result with no real mechanism. ## Re-routing decision - Empirical effects of law/regulation/antitrust/crime in the Chicago tradition → `journal-of-law-and-economics`. - IO-theory of contracts/regulation/industry → `rand-journal-of-economics`; pure microeconomic theory / mechanism → `journal-of-economic-theory` or `games-and-economic-behavior`. - Management/organization-theory framing → `academy-of-management-journal`; general-interest at the top → `american-economic-review`; broad general field → `european-economic-review`. ## Output format ```text [Fit] High / Medium / Low (one-line reason) [Target] Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization [Topic tags] <2–3 closest topics> [Method/evidence] [Top risk] [Official items to re-check] [Re-route suggestion] ```