--- name: mobile-pentest description: Use when pentesting an Android/iOS app — Frida 17 instrumentation, SSL-pinning & root/jailbreak bypass, Android 14/15 CA injection, exported-component/content-provider abuse, deep-link/WebView chains, biometric bypass, Flutter/React-Native RE metadata: type: offensive phase: exploitation tools: frida, frida-tools, objection, jadx, apktool, reflutter, hermes-dec, hbctool, mitmproxy, burp, palera1n, dopamine, frida-ios-dump, bagbak, mobsf, drozer, nuclei mitre: TA0001 kill_chain: phase: [recon, exploit] step: [1, 4] attck_tactics: [TA0043, TA0001, TA0009, TA0006, TA0005] attck_techniques: [T1626, T1626.001, T1517, T1409, T1517, T1577, T1631, T1407, T1635, T1521, T1521.001, T1417, T1417.001, T1660, T1644, T1623] depends_on: [recon-osint, reverse-engineering] feeds_into: [exploit-development, web-pentest] inputs: [apk_file, ipa_file, mobile_endpoint, app_package_id] outputs: [finding_record, mobile_vulnerability_list, intercepted_traffic, extracted_secrets] references: - references/environment-interception.md - references/android-component-attacks.md - references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.md - references/insecure-storage-crypto.md - references/ios-offensive.md - references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.md scripts: - scripts/universal_unpin.js - scripts/android_ca_inject.sh - scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py - scripts/component_fuzz.sh - scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js - scripts/hermes_triage.py --- # Mobile Application Penetration Testing ## When to Activate - Android/iOS application security assessment, bug-bounty mobile triage, or app-store reconnaissance - Need to intercept TLS traffic (SSL/cert pinning, Android 14/15 Conscrypt-APEX trust store, Flutter/RN stacks) - Bypass root/jailbreak or biometric-gating controls during dynamic analysis - Enumerate and exploit exported components, content providers, deep links, and WebViews - Extract secrets from insecure storage (SharedPrefs, SQLite, Keychain, Keystore) and reverse hybrid apps ## Technique Map | Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script | |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------| | Lab build + Frida 17 server/gadget | T1635 | CWE-1188 | references/environment-interception.md | - | | Android 14/15 Conscrypt-APEX CA injection | T1521.001 | CWE-295 | references/environment-interception.md | scripts/android_ca_inject.sh | | SSL/cert-pinning bypass (Java TM/OkHttp/native) | T1521.001 | CWE-295 | references/environment-interception.md | scripts/universal_unpin.js | | Root detection bypass (RootBeer/native stat) | T1633.001 | CWE-693 | references/environment-interception.md | scripts/universal_unpin.js | | Exported activity/service/receiver abuse | T1626.001 | CWE-926 | references/android-component-attacks.md | scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py | | Content-provider SQLi / path traversal (CVE-2025-48609) | T1409 | CWE-22, CWE-89 | references/android-component-attacks.md | scripts/component_fuzz.sh | | Task hijacking / StrandHogg / TapTrap (USENIX '25) | T1517 | CWE-1021 | references/android-component-attacks.md | scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py | | Deep-link / intent-redirect / scheme hijack | T1635, T1577 | CWE-939 | references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.md | scripts/component_fuzz.sh | | WebView JS-interface RCE + file:// theft | T1577 | CWE-749 | references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.md | scripts/component_fuzz.sh | | OAuth custom-scheme callback interception | T1635 | CWE-940 | references/webview-deeplink-exploitation.md | - | | Insecure storage (SharedPrefs/SQLite/external) | T1409 | CWE-312 | references/insecure-storage-crypto.md | scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py | | Keystore/Keychain misuse + dumping | T1634 | CWE-522 | references/insecure-storage-crypto.md | scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js | | Biometric bypass (BiometricPrompt/LAContext) | T1634 | CWE-287 | references/insecure-storage-crypto.md | scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js | | iOS jailbreak + JB-detection bypass | T1635 | CWE-693 | references/ios-offensive.md | scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js | | IPA decrypt / class-dump / URL-scheme abuse | T1409, T1635 | CWE-200 | references/ios-offensive.md | scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js | | Flutter RE / reFlutter pinning bypass | T1521.001 | CWE-295 | references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.md | scripts/hermes_triage.py | | React Native Hermes bytecode decompile | T1640 | CWE-656 | references/crossplatform-re-instrumentation.md | scripts/hermes_triage.py | ## Quick Start ```bash # ---- ANDROID ---- # 0. Pull + statically triage the APK (manifest, secrets, exported surface, framework ID) adb shell pm path com.target.app # locate split APKs adb pull /data/app/.../base.apk . python3 scripts/manifest_attack_surface.py base.apk -o surface.json jadx -d src base.apk & apktool d base.apk -o decoded # 1. Frida 17: match server to host tools; push + run frida --version # e.g. 17.x -> use matching server adb push frida-server-17.x-android-arm64 /data/local/tmp/frida-server adb shell "su -c 'chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server && /data/local/tmp/frida-server &'" # 2. Trust Burp CA on Android 14/15 (APEX is immutable -> Zygote namespace bind-mount) bash scripts/android_ca_inject.sh 9a5ba575.0 cacert.pem # see reference for cert hashing # 3. Spawn target with universal unpinning + root-detection bypass frida -U -f com.target.app -l scripts/universal_unpin.js --no-pause # 4. Hit the exported attack surface from surface.json bash scripts/component_fuzz.sh com.target.app surface.json # ---- iOS ---- frida-ios-dump -o app.ipa com.target.app # decrypt + pull (jailbroken) frida -U -f com.target.app -l scripts/ios_bypass_suite.js --no-pause # JB + pinning + biometric + keychain # ---- HYBRID ---- file decoded/assets/index.android.bundle # "Hermes JavaScript bytecode" => RN python3 scripts/hermes_triage.py base.apk # detect Flutter/RN, drive reFlutter/hermes-dec ``` ## OPSEC & Detection (summary) | Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / app-side) | OPSEC note | |-----------|-----------------|------------------------------|------------| | Frida instrumentation | `frida-server`/`gadget` ports (27042), `re.frida.server`, suspicious maps regions, named pipes `linjector` | App scans `/proc/self/maps` for `frida`, checks D-Bus port, thread `gum-js-loop`; Play Integrity | Use `frida-gadget` renamed lib, custom port `frida-server -l 0.0.0.0:1337`, magisk-hide / Shamiko | | CA injection (APEX) | New trust anchor in process trust store; cert CN mismatch on pinned hosts | Network Security Config `` excludes user store; pinning catches it | Mount lives only in Zygote ns, vanishes on Zygote crash — re-inject; nothing written to /system | | SSL-pinning bypass | TLS handshake to proxy IP; cert chain not app-pinned cert | App-side pin failure callbacks fire (if logged); telemetry SDK sees proxy cert | Hook before first request; for Flutter prefer reFlutter patch over runtime to avoid crash loops | | Root/JB bypass | `getprop ro.debuggable`, su binaries, magisk paths queried | RootBeer/iXGuard SDK reports; SafetyNet/Play Integrity attestation server-side | Bypass client checks only; server-side attestation (Play Integrity / DeviceCheck) is unaffected | | Exported component abuse | `am start`/`startservice`/`broadcast` from adb; foreign UID intent | App logs unexpected caller UID; `Binder.getCallingUid()` checks | Use on-device malicious app for realism; adb leaves shell history | | Content-provider traversal | `content query` with `../`; openFile on out-of-dir path | FileProvider canonical-path check; CVE-2025-48609 patched Mar 2026 SPL | URL-encode `..%2f` to dodge naive filters; read-only first | | TapTrap / task hijack | Transparent activity transition, taskAffinity overlap, animationScale abuse | TapTrap fixed Dec 2025 SPL; check `targetSdk`, taskAffinity="" | Zero-permission; works