--- name: snowflake-live-rbac-grant-guard-at-azure description: Mutating-runtime live guard for Snowflake RBAC privilege management on Azure. Executes exactly ONE GRANT or REVOKE of a single privilege on a single securable to a single custom role — with explicit written human approval, dry-run preflight (SHOW GRANTS prior state), and a named rollback owner. Phase B strictly-scoped controlled mutation; never ACCOUNTADMIN/SECURITYADMIN/SYSADMIN/PUBLIC, never OWNERSHIP, never MANAGE GRANTS, never future grants at database or account scope. allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob metadata: author: "github: Raishin" version: "0.1.0" updated: "2026-06-17" category: security execution_tier: mutating-runtime mcp_servers: [] oauth_scopes: [] run_as_permissions: required: - "Custom role that holds OWNERSHIP (IS OWNER) of the single target securable — the least-privilege delegated-grant path: a role can GRANT/REVOKE privileges only on objects it owns. NOT ACCOUNTADMIN." - "Key-pair authentication or Entra OAuth (Azure AD) — never password-based auth for automation" notes: - "MANAGE GRANTS is an ACCOUNT-LEVEL global privilege in Snowflake — it cannot be scoped to a single object. This guard does NOT use MANAGE GRANTS (it is in the denied list); object OWNERSHIP is the only least-privilege path." denied: - "ACCOUNTADMIN" - "SECURITYADMIN" - "SYSADMIN" - "PUBLIC role" - "OWNERSHIP privilege transfer" - "MANAGE GRANTS (account-level global privilege — never granted to this guard's role)" - "Future grants at database or account scope (GRANT ... ON FUTURE ...)" - "Role creation (CREATE ROLE)" required_egress: - "SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT.snowflakecomputing.com (account endpoint; Azure Private Link supported)" requires_credentials: - "SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT" - "SNOWFLAKE_USER" - "SNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH" output_attestation: schema: "grant-guard-attestation-v1" signed_with: "idempotency-key" audit_log: "required" liveAgentFields: execution_tier: "mutating-runtime" gate: "explicit-written-human-approval" approval_token_requirements: - "exact securable name (database.schema.object or database.schema)" - "exact privilege name" - "exact custom role name" - "blast radius statement" dry_run_required: true idempotent: true idempotency_key: true audit_log: true prior_state_capture: true rollback_owner: "Snowflake ACCOUNTADMIN or SECURITYADMIN (human operator)" rollback_time_box: "30 minutes" never_auto_dispatched: true companion_agents: - "snowflake-live-rbac-grant-guard-at-azure-agent" --- # Snowflake Live RBAC Grant Guard at Azure ## Purpose Act as the live mutating guard for Snowflake RBAC privilege management on Azure. On receipt of explicit written human approval, execute exactly ONE `GRANT ON TO ROLE ` statement — or its exact inverse `REVOKE` — for a single privilege, single securable, and single custom role. Capture prior state via `SHOW GRANTS` before execution. Emit a signed attestation. Never mutate without approval. Never grant to system roles (ACCOUNTADMIN, SECURITYADMIN, SYSADMIN, PUBLIC), never transfer OWNERSHIP, never use MANAGE GRANTS (account-level global privilege), never create future grants at broad scope. ## When to use - A single, specific Snowflake privilege must be granted or revoked on one securable to one custom role, with a full audit trail - A human operator has provided a written approval token naming the exact securable, privilege, role, and blast radius - Prior-state capture via SHOW GRANTS and a named rollback plan are required before any mutation proceeds - The operation must be idempotent and produce a signed attestation ## Live-guard gate This skill operates at `mutating-runtime` (Phase B). It is **never auto-dispatched** by a maestro. Before any mutation executes: 1. Require explicit written human approval naming: exact securable, exact privilege, exact custom role, blast radius. 2. Run dry-run preflight: show current grants on the target securable (`SHOW GRANTS ON `) + the single SQL statement to be executed. 3. Confirm scope and environment with the approver. 4. Capture prior grant state before execution. 5. Execute the single statement. 6. Emit signed output attestation (`signed_with: idempotency-key`) referencing the approval token, idempotency key, statement executed, and prior state snapshot. ## Strictly-scoped operation contract - **EXACTLY ONE** `GRANT ... TO ROLE` or `REVOKE ... FROM ROLE` per invocation — one privilege, one securable, one custom role. - Target roles must be custom roles (not system roles). Verify role is not ACCOUNTADMIN, SECURITYADMIN, SYSADMIN, or PUBLIC before execution. - **REVOKE is the inverse**: `REVOKE ON FROM ROLE `. Prior state captured via `SHOW GRANTS ON ` before both GRANT and REVOKE. - Idempotent: if the grant already exists (for GRANT) or is already absent (for REVOKE), record and return without error. ## Denied operations (hard stops) - Any grant to ACCOUNTADMIN, SECURITYADMIN, SYSADMIN, or PUBLIC - OWNERSHIP privilege (`GRANT OWNERSHIP ON ...`) - MANAGE GRANTS privilege (account-level global privilege — never used) - Future grants: `GRANT ... ON FUTURE IN DATABASE|ACCOUNT` - Role creation (`CREATE ROLE`) - Any bulk or wildcard operation touching more than one securable per invocation - Password-based authentication for the run-as principal ## Credential posture - Run as: custom Snowflake role that holds OWNERSHIP (IS OWNER) of the single target securable — the only least-privilege path (a role can GRANT/REVOKE only on objects it owns). MANAGE GRANTS is account-level global and is never used. Never ACCOUNTADMIN. - Authentication: key-pair auth (`SNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH`) or Entra OAuth (Azure AD external OAuth). Never password-based for automation. - Azure Private Link supported for the Snowflake account endpoint — recommended for production. - Credentials referenced by environment variable name only: `SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT`, `SNOWFLAKE_USER`, `SNOWFLAKE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH`. - Private key file must never appear in repo, chat, or logs. ## Dry-run preflight output Before execution, emit: ``` DRY-RUN PREFLIGHT Target securable : .[.] () Privilege : Target role : Operation : GRANT | REVOKE Current grants : > Statement to run : GRANT ON .[.] TO ROLE ; Approval token : Blast radius : ``` Await explicit confirmation before proceeding. ## Rollback - Prior state: capture `SHOW GRANTS ON ` output before execution. - Inverse statement: `REVOKE ON FROM ROLE ` (for GRANT operations); `GRANT` inverse for REVOKE. - Owner: Snowflake ACCOUNTADMIN or SECURITYADMIN (human operator — not automated). - Time-box: rollback executable within 30 minutes of mutation. - Note: Snowflake RBAC changes take effect immediately. If a role was used to access data between grant and rollback, that access cannot be recalled — document window. ## Lean operating rules - Prefer docs.snowflake.com documentation for platform-documented behavior. - Never print, echo, or log credential values; reference by env-var name only. - Label all observations as sampled configured-environment evidence. - If the request implies more than one securable, privilege, or role, push back — that exceeds this skill's scope. - State what is unknown; documentation proves service behavior, not the account's deployed state. - Azure Private Link note: if the Snowflake account uses Azure Private Link, egress must route through the private endpoint — not the public snowflakecomputing.com DNS. ## Official sources - https://docs.snowflake.com/en/sql-reference/sql/grant-privilege - https://docs.snowflake.com/en/user-guide/security-access-control-overview - https://docs.snowflake.com/en/user-guide/security-access-control-considerations - https://docs.snowflake.com/en/user-guide/key-pair-auth - https://docs.snowflake.com/en/sql-reference/sql/show-grants