--- name: strategic-commitment description: "Activate when: someone says 'they don't believe we'll follow through', 'how do I make my threat credible?', 'how do we deter a competitor from entering?', 'we need to lock in this customer/partner', 'should we burn our bridges?', or when a stated threat or promise is being discounted by the other side. Do NOT activate when: the problem is capability (you cannot execute the threat, not just credibility that you will), or when the environment is changing so fast that any lock-in creates more rigidity than credibility gain." --- # Strategic Commitment ## Overview Strategic commitment converts "I might do X" into "I will do X" — not through rhetoric but by *changing payoff structure* so follow-through is the rational move. Schelling (1960, Nobel 2005): keeping options open undermines you when opponents predict you'll rationally back down. A commitment device removes that prediction by making retreat more expensive than execution. Composes with: [`prisoners-dilemma`](../prisoners-dilemma/SKILL.md) (diagnose defection traps) · [`zero-sum-game`](../zero-sum-game/SKILL.md) (confirm game structure) · [`batna-zopa`](../batna-zopa/SKILL.md) (BATNA sets outside option; commitment governs how credibly you communicate it). ## When to Use Apply when: - Designing a competitive deterrence posture — making a potential entrant believe you will fight, not accommodate - Making a promise or pledge credible to a counterparty who doubts your follow-through - In negotiation where the other side exploits your visible flexibility - Signaling strategic intent to multiple audiences with a single costly action - Evaluating whether a competitor's stated threat is real or theatrical **When NOT to use:** commitment is unobservable to the target audience; environment changes so fast that lock-in outweighs credibility gain; cost of following through exceeds the value being protected; genuine one-shot anonymous game with no reputational audience. ## Coaching Novices (Adaptive Front Door) - **Engine mode:** user has a concrete case → run The Process directly. - **Coach mode:** user is unfamiliar → guide step by step. In Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop. 1. What-it-is: commitment makes threats credible by locking yourself in so follow-through is the rational choice. 2. Check fit: does the other side disbelieve your threat? If problem is *capability* (can't execute), not credibility, stop here. 3. Elicit their case: specific threat, audience, why they doubt follow-through. > **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]** 4. Run CAVE audit. Ask: "What happens if you don't follow through? What is the current cost of retreat?" > **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]** 5. Name which device fits and why it changes payoffs — not just rhetoric. > **[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]** ## The Process Run the **Credibility Audit (CAVE)**, then design the **Commitment Device**. 1. **State the threat precisely:** action · trigger · audience. Example: "If X enters at price Y, we match within 30 days." 2. **CAVE audit** (all four required or the commitment is theatrical): - **C — Capability:** resources to execute? - **A — Action taken:** irreversible action making retreat costly? - **V — Visibility:** can the audience observe the commitment? - **E — Enforcement:** third party (contract/regulator/reputation) penalizing non-execution? Weakest element = design target. 3. **Cost of retreat now:** if retreat is cheap, threat is not credible. Device must raise this cost until retreat is no longer dominant. 4. **Choose device:** sunk-cost · reputation · third-party constraint · organizational lock-in. 5. **Test post-commitment game tree:** re-draw payoffs — is follow-through non-dominated at execution? Stop-rule: if retreat still dominant, device is insufficient. 6. **Rigidity risk:** (a) scenarios where follow-through becomes irrational? (b) exit clauses for material-change? (c) does conditionality undermine deterrence? ### Output: Commitment Design Report ``` Threat/promise: CAVE: C= · A= · V= · E= · Weakest= Cost of retreat now: Device chosen: Post-commitment payoffs: before= · after= · deterrence= Rigidity risks: · exit clauses: <...> · conditionality: Recommendation: ``` *→ Method in Action: [Amazon's Everyday Low Price Commitment (1994–present)](examples/amazon-everyday-low-price-commitment-1994-present.md)* ## Commitment Packs **Entry Deterrence:** Irreversible capacity investment lowers marginal cost of price war. Without sunk cost, backward induction shows accommodation — threat incredible. **Negotiation:** Credibly narrow your BATNA. Walk-away must be verifiable or reputation-backed; unverifiable claims are cheap talk. **Brand Guarantees:** "Lifetime warranty" works when honoring costs are sunk into brand value. Startups need contract-based enforcement instead. ## Applying It Well - Distinguish capability from credibility — commitment devices address credibility only; solve capability first. - Announcement without action is the most common error — change *payoff structure*, not rhetoric. - Rigidity is a real cost; design exit clauses for material-change conditions before committing. - Third-party enforcement is most reliable; reputation-based fails when audience is inattentive or future is heavily discounted. - Apply CAVE to the *opponent's* threats too — many are theatrical. *→ Primary sources: [references/sources.md](references/sources.md)* ## Common Rationalizations **[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.** | Fake move | Reality | |---|---| | [D] "We announced publicly — it's credible now" | Raises reputational cost of retreat but not material payoff at execution. If retreat is still cheaper, opponents call the bluff. | | [D] "Our track record proves we follow through" | Track records work in *similar* situations. A new game with new stakes requires commitment re-established in that context. | | [D] "The contract has a penalty clause" | Only if penalty exceeds breach gain and enforcement is fast. Clauses set below defection gain are not commitment devices. | | [D] "Burning bridges is too risky — we need flexibility" | The cost of flexibility is reduced credibility. Requires explicit comparison, not a default preference for optionality. | | [D] "Our CEO's word should be enough" | CEO declarations carry reputational cost for the individual but no structural lock-in. Contracts and sunk investments are stronger. | | [D] "The threat will deter — they're rational and know we'll fight" | Rational opponents reason backward: if fighting is costly at execution, they will enter. Rationality is *why* commitment devices are necessary. | | *→ Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern* | *What went wrong and why* | ## Red Flags - Announcement only — no structural payoff change · CAVE not fully run - Post-commitment game tree not drawn — retreat may still be dominant - Rigidity risk not assessed · opponent's threat taken at face value without CAVE - Device depends on a single individual · penalty clause below defection gain ## Verification - [ ] Threat stated precisely: action, trigger, audience named - [ ] CAVE applied: all four elements evaluated; weakest identified - [ ] Current cost of retreat quantified — if cheap, commitment is theatrical - [ ] Device type chosen with reasoning - [ ] Post-commitment game tree drawn: retreat no longer dominant at execution - [ ] Rigidity risk assessed: at least one costly follow-through scenario addressed --- *Part of **deciqAI Knowledge Skills** — 225 open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. The same skills power every deciqAI agent, which runs them autonomously to operate your company. **See it run → https://www.deciqai.com/s/strategic-commitment** · Built by deciqAI · github.com/deciqAI · Contributions welcome.*